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ABSTRACT
Epistemic trust figures prominently in our socio-cognitive practices. By assigning different
(relative) degrees of competence to agents, we distinguish between experts and novices and
determine the trustworthiness of testimony. This paper probes the claim that epistemic
trust furthers our epistemic enterprise. More specifically, it assesses the veritistic value of
competence attribution in an epistemic community, i.e., in a group of agents that collabora-
tively seek to track down the truth. The results, obtained by simulating opinion dynamics,
tend to subvert the very idea that competence ascription is essential for the functioning of
epistemic collaboration and hence veritistically valuable. On the contrary, we find that, in
specific circumstances at least, epistemic trust may prevent a community from finding the
truth effectively.
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1. Introduction
Epistemic trust figures prominently in our socio-cognitive practices. By as-
signing different (relative) degrees of competence to agents, we distinguish
between experts and novices and determine the trustworthiness of testimony.
Given the extensive division of cognitive labour in our societies in general
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and in science in particular1, the practice of competence ascription seems
to be essential for successful epistemic cooperation.2 Studies in the history
of science, too, confirm the import of competence attribution and epistemic
trust.3
This paper probes the claim that epistemic trust furthers our epistemic
enterprise. More specifically, it assesses the veritistic value of competence
attribution in an epistemic community, i.e., in a group of agents that collab-
oratively seek to track down the truth. The results, obtained by simulating
opinion dynamics, tend to subvert the very idea that competence ascription
is essential for the functioning of epistemic collaboration and hence veritis-
tically valuable. On the contrary, we find that, in specific circumstances
at least, epistemic trust may prevent a community from finding the truth
effectively. This is not to say, however, that epistemic trust is always veri-
tistically detrimental. Our simulation results confirm that socio-cognitive
practices which strongly couple competence ascription and objective exper-
tise may improve the collective truth-tracking ability.
While this study falls well in the field of veritistic social epistemology
[Goldman, 1999], it modifies and applies models of opinion dynamics to as-
sess the practice of expertise ascription.4 Simulations of opinion dynamics
are suitable for studying the veritistic value of a social practice, such as estab-
lishing relations of epistemic trust, because they allow one to model (i) how
the beliefs of agents change in time, (ii) to which degree agents approach the
truth and (iii) to which extent the agents’ doxastic trajectories depend on dif-
ferent social or institutional settings. A variety of differentmodels of opinion
dynamics have been developed in the last decade.5 Our model can be consid-
ered a synthesis of the Hegselmann-Krause model [Hegselmann and Krause,
2002, 2006] and the Lehrer-Wagner model [Lehrer andWagner, 1981], as ex-
plained below.6 To our knowledge, models of opinion dynamics have, so far,
not been directly employed to investigate the veritistic value of competence
ascription and epistemic trust. Still, differentiating between agents accord-
ing to ascribed competence can be considered, quite generally, as a way of
reducing information exchange in an epistemic group: Rather than listening
1 Kitcher [1990, 1993] pioneered the philosophical investigation of division of cognitive labour in science; for
recent, simulation-based studies, see Weisberg and Muldoon [2009], Muldoon and Weisberg [2011].
2 See also Goldman [2001].
3 Rudwick’s seminal study of the Great Devonian Controversy, for instance, makes plainly clear that the
perceived degrees of expertise had a major impact on the debate evolution [see in particular Rudwick, 1985,
pp. 418-426].
4 We hence apply a simulation approach to social epistemology [cf. Olsson, 2011].
5 See, e.g., Deffuant et al. [2002], Riegler and Douven [2009], Vallinder and Olsson [2012]; compare Douven
and Kelb [2011] for a review.
6 The model was originally developed in order to study the emergence and stability of fundamentalism [cf.
Baurmann, 2007, Baurmann et al., 2013].
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to everybody, agents mainly consider expert opinions and ignore novices.
So, epistemic trust modifies the underlying network on which the opinion
dynamics unfold. Now, simulations carried out by Zollman [2010, 2012] sug-
gest that reducing information exchange by curtailing the network may be
veritistically valuable (because it helps to maintain favorable diversity and
may prevent individual agents from skewing the consensus formation pro-
cess).7 At first glance, Zollman’s results seem to contrast with our findings
(inasmuch as competence ascription may limit information flows while de-
creasing the overall truth-tracking ability). There is, however, no contradic-
tion because the fact that a reduction of information exchange may enhance
the truth tracking ability is consistent with the fact such a reductionmay (in
other circumstances) be veritistically detrimental.
The outline of this paper is as follows: We motivate and introduce the
formal model of opinion dynamics, employed in this study, in Section 2. The
model derives from the Hegselmann-Krause model and includes a represen-
tation of the agents’ mutual competence attributions (second-order beliefs).
Based on themodel, we simulate opinion dynamics for three different set-ups
(initial and boundary conditions), as described in Section 3. These scenarios
are: (S1) attributed competence is independent of objective truth-tracking
ability, (S2) some agents gradually adjust their competence attributions in
line with objective truth-tracking ability, and (S3) initial competence attri-
bution is correlated with objective truth-tracking ability. Section 4 finally
reports the simulation results, compares the three scenarios with the origi-
nal Hegselmann-Krause model and assesses the veritistic value of the three
socio-cognitive set-ups.
2. The Model
As the model employed in this study derives from the Hegselmann-Krause
model (henceforth “HK-model”), it seems appropriate to restate the tem-
plate model in the first place before introducing our modifications.
The HK-model describes a group of 𝑛 agents,𝐺 = {1,… , 𝑛}. Each agent
𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 possesses a (first-order) belief, which is represented by a real number
between 0 and 1 (𝑥𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]).8 We assume that there is a correct belief,
the truth (𝑇 ∈ [0, 1]). Whether and how an individual agent changes her
7 For a review see Zollman [2013].
8 Some beliefs can be naturally represented as a real number (e.g., beliefs about coastal water temperatures, or
beliefs about a fair minimum wage). It’s not straightforward to represent sets of binary, propositional beliefs
as a single real number. But, instead of translating all propositional beliefs into real numbers, Riegler and
Douven [2009] have shown how to extend the HK-model so as to cover complex propositional belief states.
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opinion depends on two things: (i) the opinions of other trusted agents and
(ii) the agent’s ability to track the truth. Ad (i), an agent is assumed to
trust and listen to all other agents whose opinions lie within her confidence
interval, i.e., are not ‘too far off’. The size of the confidence interval is given
by the parameter 𝜖 ∈ ℝ+. We may define, for each agent 𝑖 at time step 𝑡, the
subgroup of agents trusted by 𝑖 as,
𝐵𝑖(𝑡) ∶= {𝑗 ∈ 𝐺 ∶ |𝑥𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑥𝑗(𝑡)| ≤ 𝜖}. (1)
Without truth-tracking ability, the first-order belief of an agent at step
𝑡 + 1 is simply the average of the beliefs of all agents she trusted at 𝑡. But,
ad (ii), the agents may possess the ability to track the truth, which means
that their beliefs are not only determined by opinions of trusted agents but
by the truth itself, as well. In sum, this gives us the following dynamics (for
all agents 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺),
𝑥𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝛼𝑖(𝑇) + (1 − 𝛼𝑖)(
1
|𝐵𝑖(𝑡)| ∑𝑘∈𝐵𝑖(𝑡)
𝑥𝑘(𝑡)), (2)
The first summand represents the objective component, the second sum-
mand the social component of belief formation. The parameter 𝛼𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]
describes the agent-specific ability to track the truth and determines the rel-
ative weights of the objective and social component. The more proficient
an agent is in terms of finding the truth, the less attention she pays to the
opinions of her trusted peers. We say that an agent 𝑖 is an expert if 𝛼𝑖 > 0,
and a novice otherwise.
In the HK-model, the agents possess varying degrees of objective com-
petence (𝛼-values) but don’t assign levels of competence or expertise to each
other. As we want to investigate the role of competence ascriptions, this
is exactly where we extend the model. We assume, accordingly, that each
agent 𝑖 possesses, besides her first-order belief (𝑥𝑖), 𝑛 further second-order be-
liefs that gauge, from 𝑖’s perspective, the expert status of the group’s agents.9
Thus, the second-order belief 𝑦𝑖,𝑗 is the level of competence agent 𝑖 assigns to
agent 𝑗. This entails that every agent assigns a degree of competence to her-
self. Like the first-order beliefs, the second-order beliefs are real numbers
between 0 and 1 (𝑦𝑖,𝑗 ∈ [0, 1]).
Having introduced second-order beliefs, we adjust, in a next step, the
conditions under which agents trust each other. It’s plausible to assume that
an agent 𝑖won’t trust an agent 𝑗 in case she considers herself an expert and 𝑗
9 These second-order beliefs correspond, of course, to the weights in the Lehrer-Wagner model [Lehrer and
Wagner, 1981].
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a novice. Along this line, we stipulate that it is necessary for agent 𝑖 to trust
agent 𝑗 that 𝑖 ascribes 𝑗 a level of competence which is at least as great as the
level of competence she assigns to herself. We may redefine, accordingly, for
each agent 𝑖 at time step 𝑡, the subgroup of agents trusted by 𝑖 as,
𝐵𝑖(𝑡) ∶= {𝑗 ∈ 𝐺 ∶ (|𝑥𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑥𝑗(𝑡)| ≤ 𝜖) ∧ (𝑦𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 𝑦𝑖,𝑖)}. (3)
Note that, in contrast to the original HK-model, the modified model al-
lows for asymmetric relations of epistemic trust; i.e., agent 𝑖may trust agent
𝑗 while agent 𝑗 does not trust agent 𝑖.
Like the first-order beliefs in the HK-model, the second-order beliefs in
the modified model evolve in time as a function of (i) social and (ii) objective
factors. The second-order dynamics can, in fact, be modeled in close analogy
to the first-order dynamics. Hence, agent 𝑖 changes her competence ascrip-
tion to some agent 𝑗 in the light of what (i) her trusted agents think about
𝑗’s competence and (ii) whether 𝑗 has some objective first-order competence,
i.e., the objective ability to track the truth. Formally, the dynamics of our
model can be specified as follows (for all agents 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺),10
𝑥𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝛼𝑖(𝑇) + (1 − 𝛼𝑖)(
1
|𝐵𝑖(𝑡)| ∑𝑘∈𝐵𝑖(𝑡)
𝑥𝑘(𝑡)) (4)
𝑦𝑖,𝑗(𝑡 + 1) = 𝛽𝑖(⌈𝛼𝑗⌉) + (1 − 𝛽𝑖)(
1
|𝐵𝑖(𝑡)| ∑𝑘∈𝐵𝑖(𝑡)
𝑦𝑘,𝑗(𝑡)), (5)
where in both equations the first summand represents the objective com-
ponent and the second summand represents the social component of belief
formation. We retain the first-order updating process of the original HK-
model, hence (4) is identical with (2). While, as before, the agent-specific
parameter 𝛼𝑖 indicates the degree to which an agent is able to track the truth
(in terms of first-order beliefs), the parameter 𝛽𝑖 ∈ [0, 1] describes the degree
to which an agent adjusts her competence ascriptions to (other) agents in
light of those agents’ truth-tracking ability (i.e., 𝛼-value). In other words,
𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 represent an agent’s objective first-order and second-order compe-
tence, respectively. Note that these two parameters are independent. One
may be able to track the truth without seeing which other agents possess this
ability; and one may be highly competent in recognizing objective experts
without being an expert oneself.
Finally, we may observe that the original HK-model (equations 1,2) is,
in a strict sense, a special case of the modified model (equations 3-5). If, e.g.,
10 Note that ⌈𝛼𝑗⌉ = 1 if 𝛼𝑗 > 0, and ⌈𝛼𝑗⌉ = 0 if 𝛼𝑗 = 0.
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for all agents 𝑖, 𝑗 (i) 𝛽𝑖 = 0 and (ii) 𝑦𝑖,𝑗(𝑡0) = 0, then the modified version
reduces to the original one.
3. The Scenarios
We simulate opinion dynamics for three different scenarios (initial and bound-
ary conditions) and will, in Section 4, compare the results with those of the
HK-model.
The three scenarios as well as the simulations with the HK-model share
the following specifications: The epistemic community contains 𝑛 = 100
agents, and the objective truth equals 𝑇 = 0.1. The confidence interval has
constant width, 𝜖 = 0.2. The objective first-order competences (𝛼-values)
are determined randomly according to the following parameters: With prob-
ability 0.2 (0.8) an agent 𝑖 displays a competence of 𝛼𝑖 = 0.1 (𝛼𝑖 = 0.0). So,
on average, 20% of all agents are truth-trackers. Moreover, the initial first-
order beliefs (0.01, 0.02, 0.03, …, 0.99, 1.0) are regularly distributed over the
interval [0, 1]. The initial second-order beliefs and the agents’ second-order
competences (𝛽-values) vary from scenario to scenario (see below).
The three set-ups we distinguish are:
Scenario S1) No objective second-order competence. The initial second-order
beliefs are chosen randomly from the interval [0, 1] (uniform distribu-
tion); the agents possess no objective second-order competence (𝛽𝑖 = 0
for all agents 𝑖 = 1…𝑛). In this scenario, the competence ascrip-
tions (second-order beliefs) to some agent are not directly linked to that
agent’s objective truth-tracking ability.
Scenario S2) Positive second-order competence. The initial second-order be-
liefs are chosen randomly from the interval [0, 1] (uniform distribu-
tion); the agent specific 𝛽-values are determined in analogy to, but
independently of, the 𝛼-values; i.e., with probability 0.2 (0.8) an agent
𝑖 displays a second-order competence of 𝛽𝑖 = 0.1 (𝛽𝑖 = 0.0). So, on av-
erage, 20% of the agents can track objective first-order expertise, but
these agents with 𝛽𝑖 > 0 are not necessarily identical with the agents
that display 𝛼𝑖 > 0. In other words, there is no initial (prior) knowl-
edge about the group members’ objective expertise, but some agents
gradually learn, in the course of the opinion exchange, which agents
do and which don’t possess objective first-order competence.
Scenario S3) Prior knowledge of truth-tracking ability. The initial competen-
ce ascriptions (second-order beliefs) to other agents are correlated with
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Figure 1: Illustrative opinion dynamics of the original HK-model. First-
order beliefs are plotted against time. The doxastic trajectories of truth-
trackers (𝛼𝑖 > 0) are colored blue, those of novices (𝛼𝑖 = 0) red. The truth
(𝑇 = 0.1) is marked by a dotted line.
those agents’ objective first-order competence (𝛼-values).11 But the
agents possess no objective second-order competence (𝛽𝑖 = 0 for all
agents 𝑖 = 1…𝑛). So in this third scenario, it is at least approximately
clear, to all agents and right from the start, who is a truth-tracker and
who isn’t—and this prior knowledge is reflected in the initial compe-
tence ascriptions.
4. The Results
Figure 1 displays two illustrative opinion dynamics of the originalHK-model,
i.e., without second-order beliefs. These dynamics are thoroughly studied
in Hegselmann and Krause [2006] and serve as a point of reference for our
investigation. The two plots nicely illustrate the key features of the HK-
model (given the specific initial and boundary conditionswe assume): Partial
consensus formation predates the gradual truth rapprochement; the truth-
trackers (blue) drag the novices (red) towards the truth; and the agents con-
verge, in the long run, against the truth.
11 That is, for every agent 𝑖, the initial value of 𝑦𝑖,𝑗 is randomly drawn from the interval [0.3, 1] if agent 𝑗 is a
truth-seeker (𝛼𝑗 > 0), and from the interval [0,0.7] otherwise. Consequently, truth-seekers are, on average,
ascribed higher competence than non-truth-seekers. More precisely, consider a truth-seeker 𝑗 and a non-truth-
seeker 𝑘. Then, for every agent 𝑖, the probability that 𝑦𝑖𝑗 > 𝑦𝑖𝑘 is,
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > 𝑦𝑖𝑘) = Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > 𝑦𝑖𝑘|𝑦𝑖𝑘 < 0.3)Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑘 < 0.3) + Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > 𝑦𝑖𝑘|𝑦𝑖𝑘 ≥ 0.3)Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑘 ≥ 0.3)
= 3/7 + 4/7[Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > 𝑦𝑖𝑘|𝑦𝑖𝑘 ≥ 0.3&𝑦𝑖𝑗 > 0.7)Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > 0.7)
+Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > 𝑦𝑖𝑘|𝑦𝑖𝑘 ≥ 0.3&𝑦𝑖𝑗 ≤ 0.7)Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 ≤ 0.7)]
= 3/7 + 4/7[3/7 + 1/2 ⋅ 4/7] = 41/49 ≈ 0.84.
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Figure 2: Illustrative opinion dynamics of the modified model in scenario
S1). First-order beliefs are plotted against time. The doxastic trajectories of
truth-trackers (𝛼𝑖 > 0) are colored blue, those of novices (𝛼𝑖 = 0) red. The
truth (𝑇 = 0.1) is marked by a dotted line.
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Figure 2 displays illustrative opinion dynamics of scenario S1). So, agents
ascribe degrees of expertise to each other and only trust other agents that
are deemed more competent than oneself. This modification, the plots make
clear, heavily influences the opinion dynamics. We may, first of all, ob-
serve that, compared to the HK-model, the epistemic communities show
a poor veritistic performance. Except in panel (b), where the entire group
approaches the truth, only a few agents, and virtually no novices at all, suc-
ceed in tracking down the truth. Secondly, there are some red agents that
don’t alter their position at all (horizontal trajectories) as well as some blue
agents which asymptotically approach the truth. These agents are not in-
fluenced by the opinions of other agents because they consider themselves as
more competent (than all the other agents which fall within their confidence
interval) and hence only trust themselves. Note that this doesn’t prevent
other agents from trusting them. Thirdly, we observe that truth-trackers
(blue) which don’t approach the truth typically stabilize somewhat below
(but within the 𝜖-interval of) a group of novices. These truth-trackers are
‘caught’ between the truth and a subgroup of novices they trust. Unlike in
the HK-model, they don’t succeed in dragging the novices towards the truth
because, coincidentally, the novices do not trust the truth-trackers, that is
ascribe lower competence levels to the truth-trackers than to themselves. So,
it’s because of asymmetric relations of epistemic trust that the agents don’t
reach the truth. Fourthly, although, in panel (f), themainstream of the com-
munity has roughly agreed on a false opinion (spurious consensus), it seems
that there is no full and broad consensus without having reached the truth
(cf. panel (b)). In other words, the illustrative plots suggest that full agree-
ment is an indicator of truth-proximity. Fifthly, the illustrative simulations
(d) and (f) demonstrate that the modified dynamics do not necessarily stabi-
lize on a fixed point but may exhibit oscillations, which is an interesting and
potentially explanatorily powerful feature of the model.
Figure 3 displays illustrative opinion dynamics of scenario S2). Some of
the agents possess the ability to learn, in the course of time, which agents
are truth-trackers, and which aren’t (i.e., 𝛽𝑖 > 0 for some 𝑖). In four out
of six simulations—panels (a), (c), (d), (e)—, the epistemic community suc-
cessfully tracks down the truth. So, firstly, second-order learning and exper-
tise recognition (of some agents) seems to improve the collective veritistic
performance. Secondly, if a group collectively approaches the truth, it’s be-
cause the truth-trackers (blue), lying slightly below the novices (red), drag
the novices with them; this is a mechanism which has already been observed
in the HK-model. The effect of second-order learning is, thirdly, nicely illus-
trated by trajectories of some individual novices (red), e.g., of the agent 7 in
panel (e) who, until step 38, holds a constant first-order belief of 𝑥7 = 0.07
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Figure 3: Illustrative opinion dynamics of the modified model in scenario
S2). First-order beliefs are plotted against time. The doxastic trajectories of
truth-trackers (𝛼𝑖 > 0) are colored blue, those of novices (𝛼𝑖 = 0) red. The
truth (𝑇 = 0.1) is marked by a dotted line.
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Figure 4: Illustrative opinion dynamics of the modified model in scenario
S3). First-order beliefs are plotted against time. The doxastic trajectories of
truth-trackers (𝛼𝑖 > 0) are colored blue, those of novices (𝛼𝑖 = 0) red. The
truth (𝑇 = 0.1) is marked by a dotted line.
(near the bottom of the figure). Although the mainstream, including all the
truth-trackers, is within 7’s confidence interval at least since step 25, it’s
not before step 38 that agent 7 trusts some of those mainstream members.
That can (only) be explained by the gradual adjustment of 7’s second-order
beliefs (she is downgrading her competence self-assignment while upgrad-
ing the competence attribution to truth-trackers) which, in step 38, leads
agent 7 to consider some truth-trackers as more competent than herself, and
hence to trust them. Fourthly, panel (f) shows that in scenario S2), as in
scenario S1)—cf. Figure 2(f)—, the community’s mainstream might agree
on an approximate, albeit spurious consensus. That may happen because
truth-trackers are not part of the mainstream or because they are not con-
sidered sufficiently competent by the mainstream’s members. At best, only
nearly complete consensus seems to be an indicator of verisimilitude.
Figure 4 displays illustrative opinion dynamics of scenario S3). All agents
have imprecise prior knowledge about the group member’s expertise and as-
sign initial competence levels accordingly. First and foremost, we may ob-
serve that the four simulations exhibit quick consensus formation and (si-
multaneous) collective rapprochement towards the truth. All agents eventu-
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Figure 5: Ensemble-wide mean verisimilitude evolutions of the modified
model in scenarios S1), S2), and S3); comparedwith theHegselmann-Krause-
Model. The mean verisimilitude, averaged over all agents in an ensemble of
100 simulations, is plotted against time.
ally track down the truth.12 Secondly, the truth-trackers (blue) lie somewhat
below the novices (red) and effectively pull them towards the truth; that’s,
again, the mechanism we know from the HK-model. Thirdly, there are no
novices which stubbornly stick to their original position and fail to improve
their beliefs. That is because there are no novices who consider themselves
more competent than everybody else—on the contrary, novices typically
acknowledge the greater expertise of truth-trackers. Some truth-trackers,
however, are highly self-confident, only trust themselves and asymptotically
approach the truth. Fourthly, experts are not led astray by novices. Again,
the initial alignment of expertise ascription on the one side and objective ex-
pertise on the other side helps to explain this fact (as well as the complete
truth rapprochement): Red agents consider blue agents as more competent
right from the start and hence include them in their updating process; blue
agents, on the opposite, tend to ignore red agents (for being less competent)
and hence are not influenced by their first-order opinions.
Figure 5 visualizes the results of four ensemble simulations, namely of the
three scenarios and the HK-model. Each ensemble consists of 100 individ-
ual simulations. Figure 5 displays the corresponding ensemble-wide mean
12 We are only showing 4 plots because they are representative for all the opinion dynamics in scenario S3).
36
Is Epistemic Trust of Veritistic Value?
verisimilitude evolutions (where an agent’s verisimilitude is defined as one
minus her distance to the truth, 1 − |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑇 |). So how do the three scenarios
and the HK-model compare in terms of verisimilitude increase?
In the short term (𝑡 < 20), agents approach the truth more rapidly in
scenarios S2) and S3) than in the HK-model. In scenario S1), verisimilitude
increases roughly at the same pace as in the HK-model. In sum, second-
order dynamics (i.e., the practice of ascribing competence levels and forging
relations of epistemic trust) are not detrimental in the short term; on the
contrary, theymay enable a community to approach the truthmore rapidly.
In the long run, however, things look different. Consider the benchmark
case (the HK-model), first. Here, agents track down the truth (in the long
term) and reach a verisimilitude value of 1. Besides in the HK-model, this
holds only in scenario S3), where verisimilitude approaches 1, too. In scenar-
ios S1) and S2), in contrast, mean verisimilitude converges against clearly
lower values (ca. 0.7 and 0.9, respectively) and the agents are veritistically
worse off than in the benchmark case. As a consequence, second-order dy-
namics can hinder an epistemic community from tracking down the truth in
the long run. Even with gradual second-order learning (cf. scenario S2), the
collective truth-tracking performance may be lower than without any com-
petence differentiation whatsoever (HK-model). In the different set-ups we
have studied, the practice of competence assignment is veritistically valuable
only if there is prior knowledge about the communitymembers’ objective ex-
pertise.
5. Conclusion
Before we draw any final conclusions from our investigation we better step
back for amoment and reflect on amethodological issue that’s looming large.
We’ve used highly simplifying models with idealizing assumptions to study
the veritistic value of competence ascription. It would be daring to claim
that these models describe real opinion dynamics in an empirically adequate
way or that they prescribe how opinions ought to be revised in a rational
way. But then, what canwe learn from such conceptualmodels anyway? We
suggest to conceive of our model as a credible world in the sense of Sugden
[2009]. Accordingly understood models are at least consistent with what
we know about opinion dynamics in general and can hence be considered
as possibly correct. Following Grüne-Yanoff [2009] and Betz [2010], they
may show us that statements we had previously taken for granted might
actually be false. We can learn from such models inasmuch as they expose
possibilities we hadn’t seen or acknowledged before. Models, understood as
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credible worlds, may also suggest novel hypotheses and hence fulfill a purely
heuristic function.
This said, we suggest to draw, from the simulation exercise, a possibilistic
conclusion only—albeit a relevant and interesting one. Against deeply en-
trenched intuitions, the socio-cognitive practice of differentiating amongst
agents according to assigned expertise is not necessarily veritistically valu-
able. In other words, we have shown that epistemic communities might,
in some situations, be better off without second-order belief dynamics; not
distinguishing between experts and novices might foster such a group’s col-
lective ability to track down the truth.
More specifically, we have seen that even the consecutive improvement of
competence ascriptions and the gradual alignment of second-order beliefs on
the one side and objective expertise on the other side does not necessarily im-
prove the collective truth-tracking ability—compared to the case where one
treats all agents as equally proficient. This has further ramifications. The
result suggests that prior knowledge about the agents’ expertise is needed for
the practice of competence ascription to be veritistically valuable. Question
is, of course: How does one obtain such knowledge? How do we recognize
experts—prior to the actual epistemic engagement? Goldman, who appreci-
ates the importance of this question for veritistic social epistemology, tries
to defuse the problem by giving it a temporal dimension [cf. Goldman, 1999,
pp. 267-271]: He claims that one can gradually learn who is an expert by
comparing the alleged expert’s opinion-trajectory with one’s own. But our
simulations, then, did suggest that such gradual revelation of true expertise
might not be enough to make competence ascription veritistically valuable;
what we need, or so it seems, is prior expert recognition, and Goldman’s pro-
posal is insufficient.
This paper calls for further, more detailed research and raises a couple
of significant questions. First of all, we have only considered very specific
initial and boundary conditions in this study. But the model promises to
display an interesting dynamic (cf. the oscillations) and deserves a system-
atic study, including, e.g., the exploration of the entire parameter space, the
combination of second-order learning and prior expert recognition (scenar-
ios 2 and 3), the introduction of dynamic 𝛼- and 𝛽-values, etc. A second
follow-up question concerns the relation between nearly complete consen-
sus and truth proximity. It is significant to understand whether and, if so,
when a consensus reliably indicates verisimilitude; and the model might be
used to study this question. A third project would look at the model from an
optimization perspective: the task is, then, to identify optimal initial condi-
tions (competence ascriptions) that maximize speed and extent of verisimil-
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itude increase.13 Fourthly, the agents’ evolving second-order beliefs induce
an endogenous, dynamic network of relations of trust, on which the opin-
ion dynamics unfold. Given the current research on network epistemology
[cf. Zollman, 2013], it seems to be promising to scrutinize the network struc-
tures that are generated by the model and to attempt to explain the opinion
dynamics in terms of the network dynamics. Fifthly, since the model rep-
resents opinion dynamics in a highly aggregated way, it might be insightful
to compare its findings with more detailed models of scientific debate.14 Fi-
nally, the results of such simulation studies need to be underpinned by case-
studies in the history of science. It seems to us that the well-documented
and thoroughly analyzed Great Devonian Controversy [cf. Rudwick, 1985]
might represent a worthwhile starting point. An equally promising case is
the systematic manipulation of competence ascriptions and its detrimental
veritistic effect in tobacco and climate change debates, as documented by
Oreskes and Conway [2010].
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